'The notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now, in Syria or in Ukraine, than they were before they invaded Ukraine or before he had to deploy military forces to Syria is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in foreign affairs or in the world generally. Real power means you can get what you want without having to exert violence.' President Barack Obama. (Goldberg 2016) The popular image is of Russia that of a soft power success story, spreading propaganda and dissimulation through its slick Russia Today television network, an army of internet trolls, and the actions of its charismatic leader, Vladimir Putin.
2 Some analysts even see Russia and China joining forces and offering an authoritarian alternative to prevailing liberal international institutions. However, this article will argue that Russian leaders have largely misunderstood the character of soft power, in ways that have become quite damaging to Russia's national interests, and have failed to develop it as an effective policy tool.
Few concepts have experienced as meteoric a rise as that of 'soft power' -that is, expanding a nation's influence through persuasion and attraction rather than through military or The Means to Success in World Politics, the term spread quickly beyond the pages of political science journals, and entered the lexicon of government officials and even military planners all around the world. It fused with another trend, 'nation branding,' that came out of business marketing and tourism agencies (Anholt 2006; Dinnie 2007 ).
In the post-cold war world, the military power balance was less salient, while the global integration of national economies accelerated. In the turbulent and rapidly changing world of the 2000s, the concept of soft power seemed to capture something new in the interactions between states, and national leaders scrambled to incorporate it into their analysis and their policies.
Attention shifted from states towards non-state actors, and from national identities and interests to norms of international behavior.
However, as is often the case, as the concept spread it came to be applied in circumstances quite different from those at its point of origin. In the process it began to lose its The release of Nye's book also coincided with the wave of 'color revolutions' that toppled pro-Russian autocrats in Georgia (2003) , Ukraine (2004) , and Kyrgyzstan (2005) (Mitchell 2012) . The Russian leadership saw these developments as the result of a deliberate policy to use democracy promotion to expand the US sphere of influence. This process picked up again in the 'Arab spring' uprisings of 2011, which triggered a fear that the US would try to encourage a democratic revolution in Russia itself.
Russian leaders were determined to master -and counter -the arts of soft power projection that seemed to so effectively serve US interests. The government invested hundreds of millions of dollars in various soft power projects, such as the Russia Today international television network launched in 2005, on which it would spend $2 billion by 2013 (Zavadski 2015) . A 2010 Ministry of Foreign Affairs policy document laid out the role that cultural promotion should play in Russian foreign policy (Ministry 2010). It argued that 'cultural diplomacy like no other aspect of "soft power" can strengthen the country's international authority' and fight off efforts to 'contain' Russia. In a 2011 speech Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov said 'Today it is clear that without a skillful use of "soft power" it is not possible to defend one's country's interests' (Studneva 2012) . In February 2013 the concept of soft power duly appeared in the Foreign Policy Concept for the first time, where it was described as 'an essential part of contemporary international politics' (Ministry 2013).
However, Russia's soft power gambit enjoyed only modest success, and its impact was drowned out by Russia's deployment of hard power in the form of its military incursions into Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) . It became apparent that the Russian understanding of soft power differed from that to be found in Nye's work, and that it was being used merely as a handmaiden to Russia's hard power (Nye 2013) .
For persuasion and attraction to work, the various players have to accept the rules of the game, the established discourse of diplomacy -and those rules were overwhelmingly shaped by the US and its Western partners. That makes it very hard for outsiders such as the BRICs to develop a soft power narrative of their own, since it is seen from the outset as a challenge to the status quo, and hence triggering hard power fears about a 'rising China' or 'revisionist Russia' (Stanovaia 2014) . Some Russian scholars question whether this western product is at all useful for the rest of the world (Kovaleva 2013 ).
Nye's theory was centered on the US use of soft power as something distinct from but complementary to hard power in maintaining the preeminent position of the United States in the global order throughout the 20 th century. The concept was developed with respect to the US in the 1990s, when it was in the unprecedented position of a 'sole superpower' in the 'unipolar'
world following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Naumov 2015) . Rising powers like China and India were keen to try to utilize soft power to boost their influence. Similarly, declining powers such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and the Russian Federation looked to soft power to try to regain their former influence, or stem their rate of decline. However, for these countries, soft power may turn out to be a costly distraction.
Since Nye's book was published, the US has seen its own soft power erode. Military interventions by the US in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya showed the limits of US hard powerand seriously damaged the US soft power image (Koniukheva 2010). President George W.
Bush's soft power packaging of the 'war on terror' failed to gain traction, alienating large majorities in Moslem countries. Did this mean that soft power no longer worked for the US -and could therefore be picked up by Russia and China? Or did it mean that soft power was redundant as a category of analysis and practice?
Putin on soft power
A central theme of Putin's presidency has been his concern to restore Russia's standing in the world, and he recognizes the importance of all dimensions of the issue -security, diplomacy, economics, and image.
When nominated acting president in December 1999 Putin, a 17 year KGB veteran, was seen as an exponent and practitioner of hard power. At the same time, however, in his preelection manifesto he laid out an ambitious program to integrate Russia with the West and catch up with the world's leading industrial powers (Putin 1999) . Lankina and Niemczyk (2015) argue that the concept of soft power was presaged in the Doctrine of Information Security approved in September 2000.
In a newspaper article published in February 2012, shortly before he was re-elected as president Putin laid out his foreign policy vision. He strongly condemned the Arab Spring, blaming it on US efforts to destabilize governments in the region under the guise of democracy promotion. He explained that:
'Soft power' is a complex of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals without the use of force, through information and other means of influence. Unfortunately, these methods are often used to encourage and provoke extremism, separatism, nationalism, manipulation of public sentiment, and outright interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states (Putin 2012 Later that year, addressing a meeting of Russian ambassadors on 9 July, he defined 'soft power' as:
The promotion of one's own interests and approaches through persuasion and attraction of empathy (simpatii) towards one's own country, based on its achievements not only in the material sphere but also in the spheres of intellect and culture (Soveshchanie poslov 2012).
Putin went on to explain:
Russia's image abroad is not formed by us, because it is often distorted and does not represent the real situation in our country nor our contribution to global civilization, In summoning the ambassadors to Moscow, Putin was resurrecting a Soviet-era practice of biennial meetings that had been discontinued in 1986. This in itself is testimony to the renewed importance he placed on Russia's global diplomatic presence. During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s, diplomacy centered on direct personal dealings with the leaders of the US and other major powers, run directly out of the presidential administration.
The burden of history
Efforts by contemporary Russian leaders to build up Russia's soft power do not start with a blank slate. They do not have to face the challenge of how to draw attention of the world public to their country, as would Estonia or Vanuatu. On the contrary, they face the problem that much of the world already has a strong -and usually negative -impression of Russia. Actions by Russian leaders are interpreted through pre-existing cognitive frameworks, which portray Russia as a dangerous and unpleasant place (Tsygankov 2009 Russia has a deep and proud history, and a distinctive culture -some Russians would say 'civilization' -which has given much to global culture (Poe 2003 The Soviet Union that arose after 1917 had a more positive side to present to the worldthat of industrial progress, scientific achievements, social equality, and so on. However, the attractive features of Soviet communism were accompanied by new forms of oppression, in the form of collectivization, the Purges, collectivization, the Gulag and so on.
On top of that the Soviet Union was pledged to world revolution, and occupied a dozen countries in Eastern Europe in the wake of World War II.
In the 1990s, Russia did not make a completely clean break with the Soviet past. The Soviet Union was dismantled by the leaders of its constituent republics, and in Russia at least it was not toppled by a popular revolution, nor even by a democratic electoral process or referendum. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned, but later resurfaced as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Some Soviet institutions collapsed, such as the central planning apparatus, but others were preserved more or less intact -such as the army, the foreign ministry, and the KGB (reformed as the Federal Security Service -FSB).
The 1990s saw the arrival of democracy and market capitalism. Far from being a triumph, however, this came to be perceived both inside and outside Russia as something of a disaster. Central Asia should have been a natural sphere for Russia's soft power influence, given its deep cultural influence over the region and continuing political and economic ties. However, Russia has steadily ceded ground to China in the region, and a process of 'derussification' has been taking place (Mukhin 2016, 56 out. Russia's ties are confined to leading circles and the 'party of power' in those countries, and typically they have few direct contacts with second or third tier officials, or with the political opposition (unless we are talking of support for separatists in Ukraine and Georgia). Labor migration from post-soviet countries has considerable potential as a source of soft power. Russia is host to the largest number of migrants after the US (some 10 million, before the 2014 crisis), and migrant worker remittances are critical for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Armenia (amounting to a quarter or more of GDP). However, migrant workers are not being developed constructively by Moscow as a soft power tool. On the contrary, they are typically treated as an economic and security threat by the authorities -and as a rallying point by Russian nationalists, appealing to xenophobic tendencies in the Russian population.
In the sphere of education, some Soviet-era advantages have been maintained. Students from the post-Soviet states study in Russian universities, and several of these have opened branches in neighboring states. However, Russia has invested inadequate resources in spreading its educational network -in contrast for example to Turkey's Gulen movement, which has created a web of Turkish and English-speaking schools and colleges in Central Asia. Cultural and scientific contacts have rarely progressed beyond formal measures, and there has been no systematic effort to tap into the expertise of people living in Russia who speak the languages and understand the cultures of these countries.
The instruments of soft power
Throughout the entire post-soviet period, the Russian Federation has failed to develop a clearly defined strategic plan for Russia's development. Despite Yeltsin's efforts to develop a new 'national idea,' no new ideological framework has emerged to fill the void left by Soviet communism. On the economic front, despite continued insistence that Russia must diversify away from oil and gas and become an innovation-based economy, in practice the country remains dependent on energy exports, its fate tied to the global oil price. The image of Russia as a 'giant gas station' (Senator John McCain) undercuts soft power efforts to promote Russia as a member of the G8 group of advanced industrial economies. Moreover, some Russian companies, including Gazprom, face accusations of 'exporting corruption,' which is sometimes seen, especially in Eastern Europe, as a part of Russia's soft power influence projection (Kazantsev 2012) . The lack of a strategic vision also applies to foreign policy, which has oscillated between efforts to join the Western club and resentment at not being allowed through the door. In practice, despite the passage of a series of fundamental strategy documents, foreign policy has largely been reactive to external developments. But without clear long-term goals it will be impossible for Russia to devise an effective soft power strategy.
Western soft power is traditionally a combination of the actions of government agencies and the activity of numerous commercial and non-government actors, pursuing their own agendas and independent of government influence. In the case of Russia, the latter are relatively few in number, and instead we have seen a proliferation of government and quasi-governmental agencies that are engaged in soft power promotion on behalf of the state. 
Russia Today
The new international television network Russia Today was designed not so much to promote Russia's image in the world, but to change the dynamics of the global media market by breaking Any viewer of Russian Today will soon experience cognitive dissonance. Domestically, the Russia regime legitimizes itself as a defender of traditional conservative values (nationalism, religion, a strong state, a loyal press, family values and so on). But Russian Today presents itself as a radical, free thinking critic of establishment thinking. Its broadcasts oscillate between ridiculing Western political correctness, multiculturalism, and gay rights on one side; while mounting a critique of American neoimperialism in Iraq and Libya, the excesses of capitalism, and constraints on freedom of expression in Western media. Similarly, in its ties with foreign political parties Russia spans the spectrum from support for leftists such as Die Linke (Germany) and Syriza (Greece) to rightists such as the National Front in France. At the producers' end, there is no effort to explain how to reconcile these divergent ideologies; and it is not clear how the audience sorts out these mixed messages. The omnivorous Kremlin, encouraging both ultra-left and right-wing forces, may work against itself in the long run. In order to work, soft power requires some positive ideas and values which can attract people, but it is not clear that the Russian elite has grasped this point. Thus, one should not exaggerate the scope for Russia's soft power, which is bedeviled by some deep internal contradictions.
Alongside official news agencies such as Russia Today, Russia also spawned a host of shadowy operations utilizing the internet and social media to spread false news stories reflecting badly on Russia's adversaries, and hiring internet trolls to pack chat rooms with pro-Russian commentary (Aro 2015) . Borthwick (2015) cites examples of a report that supposedly found that 26% of survey respondents in France supported ISIS, and another story of a chemical factory explosion in Louisiana on Sept 10, 2014 that never happened. These practices are a direct continuation of Soviet-era disinformation tactics and have little to do with Nye's soft power.
Mega events as a source of soft power
Above and beyond these bureaucratic structures, the Russian government has seized on a range of projects to boost Russia's image in the arts, culture, and sport. Some of these initiatives are The Sochi Olympics were on paper a success in that the games were well-run and went off without incident, and Russia finished at the top of the medals table. However, the run up to the games generated a lot of negative publicity for Russia. The Olympics ended up costing a reported $50 billion -more than all the previous winter Olympics combined (Orttung & Zhemukhov 2014) . The international media carried many stories about alleged corruption, displacement of local residents, and fears that gay athletes would be targeted by Russia's new legislation forbidding gay propaganda to minors. An additional consideration was that in order to maximize their medal count, the Russians had to master international sports such as curling and snowboarding, and had to import Western equipment and trainers to excel. So in practice the Russian "brand" was subsumed under the generic international sports culture brand (Gorokhov 2015) . This was even true of the lavish opening ceremony, summarizing Russian history -most of which was designed and choreographed by American and British experts hired for the purpose.
The timing of the games was unfortunate, since they coincided with the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. The closing ceremony took place on 23 February -one day after President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine in the face of street protests, and three days before Russian special forces ('little green men') started seizing government buildings in Crimea. It would be hard to imagine a starker example of the contrast between soft power and hard power. Needless to say, the global image of Putin's Russia was more indelibly shaped by the latter than the former. After the challenge to Putin's rule during the street protests of winter 2011, the Kremlin responded by cracking down on the opposition and painting them as paid agents of the West.
This coincided with a broader campaign asserting 'traditional values' in the face of Western degeneracy, focusing on topics such as gay rights and the alleged abuse of Russian children adopted by Western parents (a law was passed banning foreign adoptions). This campaign helped to boost Putin's popularity at home, but it sharply damaged Russia's image abroad. The posterchildren for the campaign were the two young women of the art-punk rock group Pussy Riot, who were jailed for two years in 2014 after staging a protest in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. (Rutland 2014 ) Their arrest and sentencing triggered waves of protests in Western cities, and after their release they became international celebrities.
The case of Rossotrudnichestvo
Among the most salient of the new agencies that were created to mount Russia's soft power offensive is Rossotrudnichestvo. Its goal was to spread Russian influence amongst the 25 million or so ethnic Russians and 100 million Russian speakers in the post-soviet space. The ministry's 2010 document on cultural policy made it clear that while Russian culture is 'open to the whole world,' 'a priority is the development of bilateral and multilateral relations with CIS countries.' (Ministry 2010) This conforms to the argument advanced above that the main concern of Russia's soft power strategy was to prevent color revolutions in the post-soviet states. In the 1990s this region was referred to as the 'near abroad' (blizhnee zarubezhie) but in the 2000s
Russian leaders and diplomats stopped using this phrase, since it implied that they were secondclass states, with less sovereignty than the countries of the 'far abroad.' The preferred term by the Russian Foreign Ministry these days is 'near neighbors,' perhaps echoing the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, launched in 2003.
It has representatives in 74 countries but its total staff is only 600 (of which 415 are local hires) (Studneva 2012) . This is quite modest compared for example to the 7,000 staff that work Russia came late to the soft power game, with a mixture of strengths and weaknesses.
The lingering effects of the Soviet legacy, plus the disruptive Russian experiences with the transition to market economics and democracy in the 1990s, combine to make soft power a hard sell for Russian leaders. Economic success is a prerequisite for soft power -a country that is experiencing economic stagnation lacks the sense of progress and optimism necessary to project a positive international image. Russia was growing strongly in the 2000s but never recovered its pre-crisis growth rate after the 2008 crash.
The continuing dependence on commodity exports, the volatility of the ruble exchange rate (which gyrates in step with the world oil price), and the persistent and pervasive nature of corruption, all undermine Russia's sense of optimism and progress and make it difficult for the country to present an upbeat, positive image to the world.
